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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURE-EXCLUSIONARY RULE-GRAND JURY-The Supreme Court has
held that a grand jury witness offered immunity is not entitled to a
suppression hearing and may not refuse to answer questions based
on evidence obtained in an illegal search.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a warrant author-
izing the search of respondent John Calandra's place of business,
the Royal Machine and Tool Co.' The warrant specified that the
objects of the search were gambling paraphernalia; it authorized the
seizure of betting slips, cash and betting records. On December 15,
1970, federal agents conducted an extensive search of the entire
business premises. Although no gambling paraphernalia were
found, one agent did find a card which indicated that a known
victim of "loansharking" had been making periodic payments to
Calandra. The agents seized this card along with stock certificates,
company records and address books. Calandra was subpoenaed to
testify before a special federal grand jury investigating possible vio-
lations of federal laws prohibiting extortionate credit transactions.'
He appeared, but refused to answer questions, invoking his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.3 The federal prose-
cutor requested that Calandra be granted transactional immunity.'
Calandra moved to suppress the seized evidence on the grounds that
the search warrant was issued without probable cause and that the
search exceeded the scope of the warrant.5 At the immunity hearing,
1. The master affidavit filed in support of the search warrant contained evidence from
three sources: court authorized wiretaps, physical surveillance, and informants. In re
Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 892-94 (1970).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1968), authorizes United States attorneys to request transactional
immunity (i.e., immunity from prosecution) for any witness whose testimony the attorney
feels is necessary.
5. The motion was pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) (1961), which allows the victim of
an unlawful search and seizure to have seized property returned to him and suppressed as
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Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer questions based
on the evidence seized in the December search.
The district court' held that due process required the granting of
a suppression hearing to a grand jury witness. The evidence was
suppressed,7 and Calandra was excused from answering grand jury
questions based on that evidence. The court of appeals affirmed.,
On certiorari,' the only issue before the Supreme Court was the very
narrow question of whether a grand jury witness was entitled to
suppress illegally seized evidence and thereby avoid answering
questions based on that evidence.'" The Court reversed."
Justice Powell balanced two competing concepts: the historical
role of the grand jury and the exclusionary rule. Historically,'" the
grand jury has fulfilled two functions: determining whether proba-
ble cause exists to bring criminal charges against an individual; and
protecting citizens from unfounded accusations. In order to carry
out these functions, the grand jury has been accorded broad investi-
gatory powers,' 3 while the rights of grand jury witnesses have been
evidence for certain enumerated reasons. The motion to suppress must be made "before trial
or hearing" unless circumstances prevent it.
6. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
7. Chief Judge Battisti found that there was no probable cause to support the issuance of
the warrant. Id. at 742-44. He also found that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant
since the evidence seized was not that specified in the warrant. Id. at 745.
8. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
9. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
10. The government did not seek review of the court of appeals finding that the search
and seizure was unlawful, nor was the order directing the return of the seized property
challenged.
11. The decision was 6-3 for reversal. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for reversal, joined
by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall.
12. For discussion of the history of the grand jury see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956); G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 1-44 (1906); Kennedy & Briggs, Historical and Legal
Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 251 (1955). See also Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); Russell v. United
States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
13. For example, as Justice Powell points out, the grand jury may compel a witness to
appear. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, (1959) (upholding statute authorizing interstate
subpoena); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (upholding international subpoena).
The grand jury witness must testify, even if he fears retribution. Piemont v. United States,
367 U.S. 556 (1961) (witness feared for his life and lives of his family); Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919) (public duty to testify). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
The grand jury may hear incompetent or illegal evidence and base indictments thereon.
United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.3 (1966) (evidence obtained in violation of fifth
Vol. 13: 107
1974 Recent Decisions
restricted.'" Although the grand jury theoretically is subject to judi-
cial control," the Court has been loath to uphold challenges which
would result in any delay to a grand jury investigation or would in
any way circumscribe the investigatory function of the grand jury."'
Turning to the exclusionary rule, Justice Powell noted that the
prime purpose of the rule is the deterrence of unlawful police activ-
amendment will sustain indictment); accord, Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958);
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (hearsay evidence); Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245 (1910) (incompetent evidence).
The witness's fifth amendment privilege may be overridden by a grant of immunity. This
immunity need not guarantee that the witness will never be prosecuted for crimes he may
reveal (transactional immunity), but only that his compelled testimony will not be used
against him if he is brought to trial (use immunity). Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972). Contra, Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
14. He may not present favorable testimony. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). He
is not permitted to have his attorney present in the grand jury room. FED. R. CraM. P. 6(d).
He cannot assert his first amendment rights, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
challenge the materiality of the questions asked, Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92 (1906);
or attack the constitutionality of the statute the violation of which the grand jury is investi-
gating, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919); Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970). He may, however, assert common law privileges;
e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (husband-wife).
The respective positions of grand jury and witness have provoked some criticism. See, e.g.,
Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Fah-
ringer, Grand Juries: Lawyer for the Witness, TfuAL, Jan.-Feb., 1973, at 12; Foster, Grand
Jury Practice in the 1970's, 32 OIo ST. L.J. 701 (1971); Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury as
the New Inquisition, 50 MICH. ST. B.J. 693 (1971); Note, American Grand Jury: Investigatory
and Indictment Powers, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 136 (1973). But see, e.g., Sharp, Grand Juries:
An Investigative Force, TRiAL, Jan.-Feb., 1973, at 10; Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack
(Part III), 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 214 (1955); 39 CALIF. L. Rav. 573 (1951).
15. For example, the grand jury cannot itself find a witness in contempt, but must ask
the court to do so. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960); Brown v. United States, 359
U.S. 41 (1959); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); FED. R. CraM. P. 17(g). The court may
discharge the grand jury at any time. FED. R. CiuM. P. 6(g). It is the court which issues
subpoenas. FED. R. CraM. P. 17(c). A subpoena may be challenged if compliance would be
unreasonable or oppressive. Application of Certain Chinese Family Benevolent & Dist.
Ass'ns, 19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1956); FED. R. CraM. P. 17(c). There is authority for the
proposition that a subpoena must comport with fourth amendment reasonableness standards
and that a witness may challenge a subpoena on the grounds that it is an unreasonable search
and seizure. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
See Note, United States v. Dionisio: The Grand Jury and the Fourth Amendment, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 1145, 1150 (1973). But see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (no showing
of reasonableness required).
16. Challenges to the grand jury usually come in two ways. First, a witness may refuse,
on various grounds, to comply with a subpoena. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (subpoena
too broad). Or, he may refuse to answer questions; e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (first amendment grounds); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (questions
based on illegal wiretaps); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) (grand jury investigat-
ing violation of unconstitutional statute); Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92 (1906) (ques-
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ity, with the incidental enforcement of fourth amendment rights. 7
The rule is a remedial device and will be applied only where its
remedial objective of deterrence will be most "efficaciously
served,"' 8 i.e., at trial. Since police presumably have the greatest
incentive to conduct an illegal search and seizure when a conviction
will result, the exclusion at trial of evidence so obtained should
deter most illegal police activity. Application of the rule has never
been required merely because such activity would be deterred. 9
Instead, the exclusionary rule may be invoked only by those defen-
dants in a criminal trial whose personal fourth amendment rights
have been violated." Since Calandra was not a defendant, he could
not have the evidence suppressed. Justice Powell refused to expand
the rule to include grand jury proceedings because the only police
activity to be deterred by such an expansion would be activity con-
sciously directed at producing evidence for grand jury use. Since the
evidence would not be admissible at the search victim's trial, police
would presumably have little incentive to carry out such activities.
On balance, this minimal deterrent impact would not justify the
tions immaterial). The Court has been willing to hear these challenges only if the witness has
the requisite standing. In order to gain standing, the witness must place himself in contempt,
in effect, buying a delay in the grand jury proceeding at the cost of his freedom. United States
v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971) (subpoena; contempt is required); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323 (1940) (denial of motion to quash subpoena is not appealable; contempt convic-
tion is necessary); see United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218, 1225 (6th Cir. 1972), where
Judge Miller notes that the alternative to a suppression hearing is a contempt proceeding,
which he feels is far more disruptive.'
The second challenge to the grand jury arises when a defendant challenges his indictment,
thereby placing at issue the power of the grand jury to hear evidence which would be inadmis-
sible at trial. These challenges are not successful; e.g., United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251
(1966) (evidence obtained in violation of fifth amendment privilege); Lawn v. United States,
355 U.S. 339 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (hearsay); Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (incompetent testimony).
17. The fourth amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. 414 U.S. at 348.
19. Thus. illegally seized evidence can be used to impeach a defendant's testimony.
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (exclusionary rule cannot be used as a shield to
perjury). Illegal evidence may be admitted at sentencing hearings. United States v. Schipani,
435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
20. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (defendant was not the victim of the
unlawful search and seizure).
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resultant severe impediment to grand jury investigations. The Court
also rejected respondent's argument that each grand jury question
based on illegally seized evidence works a new, independent fourth
amendment violation.'
The dissent decried Justice Powell's treatment of the exclusionary
rule as a "startling misconception"22 which entirely overlooked the
considerations of judicial integrity upon which the exclusionary rule
was first based.23 Justice Brennan saw the majority opinion as sig-
naling the beginning of the end for the exclusionary rule. 4 More
concretely, he relied on Silverthorne v. United States,25 which he
contended "plainly controls this case,"" and Gelbard v. United
States.7 In Silverthorne, papers were seized in a warrantless search
21. Justice Powell argued that the fourth amendment was designed to prevent only one
wrong-unlawful government invasions into houses, papers and effects. The violation of the
fourth amendment guarantees occurs when the illegal search and seizure is complete. Grand
jury questions based on illegally seized evidence work no new fourth amendment violation;
they are merely derived from the original violation. The derivative use of illegal evidence to
gather legal evidence is really a matter of exclusionary rule remedies rather than fourth
amendment rights. Justice Powell refused to distinguish between the direct use of illegal
evidence and indirect use of it, holding that the same deterrence analysis applies to both.
Since the derivative use was not to be at trial, Calandra cannot have the evidence suppressed.
22. 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. The exclusionary rule was first articulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), where the Court reversed a federal conviction based on evidence seized in a warrant-
less search by a federal agent. The Court noted that all federal agents and federal courts are
charged with the duty of upholding the Constitution; the Court must remain untainted in
the eyes of the people by refusing to sanction the failure of federal agents to live up to their
charge. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court affirmed convictions
based largely on evidence derived from illegal wiretaps. Justice Holmes dissented, saying that
in choosing between the desire to detect criminals and the desire to have a law abiding
government, it was better that some criminals escape than to have the government commit
crimes. Justice Brandeis also dissented, fearing "terrible retribution" if the Court permitted
the government to commit crimes in order to detect private crimes. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Byars v. United States, 273
U.S. 28 (1927); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24. Justice Brennan felt that if police activity were not deterred by excluding evidence
at the grand jury stage of the criminal process, then certainly the majority would find no
deterrent purpose in excluding it at trial.
25. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
26. 414 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. 408 U.S. 41 (1972). Gelbard arose from contempt convictions for refusal to answer
grand jury questions because they were the result of illegal wiretaps. A federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2515 (1970), provided that no evidence resulting from an illegal wiretap could be
admitted in any proceeding before a grand jury. Noting Congressional. concern for judicial
integrity, the Court held that the statute was a defense to contempt citations. Justice Powell
distinguished Gelbard on the basis of the statute: the wiretap problem is unique; the statute
was designed to handle that problem and nothing more.
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made the same day a grand jury returned indictments against the
Silverthornes. The papers were copied and the originals returned
after an application for their return was granted. The grand jury
then attempted to regain the papers through issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum. Silverthorne refused to comply and was found in con-
tempt. The Court reversed, holding that what cannot be done in one
step (illegally seizing evidence) cannot be done in two (illegally
seizing evidence and then attempting to obtain it legitimately
through a grand jury subpoena). To hold otherwise would reduce the
fourth amendment to a mere "form of words." Justice Holmes said
that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence was not to be limited
to trials; such evidence was not to be used at all.29 Justice Powell
distinguished Silverthorne on several grounds.3" First, he argued
that since Silverthorne had already been indicted when the papers
were seized, he could invoke the exclusionary rule. He was a
criminal defendant, while Calandra had not been indicted, was not
a defendant, and therefore had no standing to suppress the evi-
dence. Second, since the grand jury's investigation was over, and
the subpoena was issued merely to gather evidence for use at trial,
the real effect of the Silverthorne holding was to exclude the evi-
dence at Silverthornes' trial. Calandra's motion, on the other hand,
would deprive the grand jury of necessary testimony. Third,
Silverthorne involved no delay to the grand jury proceeding. There
had already been an adjudication, as a result of the successful appli-
cation for the return of the papers, that the search and seizure was
unlawful. There had been no such determination in Calandra and,
consequently, the grand jury investigation was delayed considera-
bly.
The dissent viewed Silverthorne differently. First, since new in-
dictments could have resulted from production of the papers, Jus-
tice Brennan found no basis for the majority's conclusion that the
real effect of Silverthorne was to exclude the evidence from trial.
Second, Justice Brennan noted that there was no indication in
Silverthorne that the district court erred in granting the application
for return. The inference to be drawn from this is that Justice
28. 251 U.S. at 392.
29. Id.
30. Justice Powell treated Silverthorne in a footnote, giving one the impression that he
would rather have ignored it entirely but was forced to deal with it only because Justice
Brennan relied so heavily on the case.
Vol. 13:i107
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Holmes simply was not concerned with potential impairment of the
grand jury investigation through the loss of the papers. This infer-
ence is supported by Justice Holmes' concern with the illegal search
and seizure and his reliance on the judicial integrity rationale to
prohibit any use of the illegally seized evidence. It was this reliance
which was most important to Justice Brennan.
Justice Powell's treatment of Silverthorne appears faulty in some
respects2 Most important is his failure to recognize the true dis-
tinction between Silverthorne and Calandra. As the dissent points
out, Silverthorne relied on the judicial integrity rationale, which
logically mandates the exclusion of illegally seized evidence at all
stages of the criminal process. Justice Powell, however, relied on the
deterrence rationale, which requires the exclusion of tainted evi-
dence only at trial. Justice Powell intimated this distinction when
he said that the broad language of Silverthorne (illegally seized
evidence should not be used at all) had been undermined by more
recent exclusionary rule cases.32 Justice Powell would have done
better to squarely face the distinction, overrule Silverthorne, and
thereby dispose of an otherwise controlling precedent.3
While the result in Calandra can be criticized and several alterna-
31. For example, Justice Powell is unduly concerned with delay of grand jury proceedings.
As Chief Judge Battisti points out, there is no evidence how many witnesses will seek hear-
ings. 332 F. Supp. at 740. It should be noted in this respect that Calandra is the first case
before the Supreme Court on the narrow issue of whether a grand jury witness may have a
suppression hearing; see, e.g., Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 866 (1952) (pre-indictment motion to suppress is rare). Compare cases cited note 16
supra. In any event, "delay" means avoidable delay, and adjudication of constitutional rights
should never be considered delay. 332 F. Supp. at 741.
32. What he meant, of course, is that the rationale for the exclusionary rule gradually
shifted from judicial integrity to deterrence. Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Re-
view: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1129 (1973). Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
636-37 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960), with cases cited note 23 supra.
33. Justice Powell's conclusion that the real effect of the Silverthorne holding was the
exclusion of the papers at trial is misleading. Silverthorne was not attempting to suppress
evidence at his trial, because he was not then being tried. He was simply refusing to comply
with a grand jury subpoena which was based on a violation of his fourth amendment rights.
The effect of Silverthorne, therefore, was to allow the exclusion of evidence from the grand
jury. (That the grand jury still retained copies of the papers, and therefore was not completely
deprived of investigatory material, may have been an important factor to the district court,
but Justice Holmes did not seem concerned with the potential impact on the grand jury
investigation.) Thus, had Justice Powell confronted Silverthorne on this basis he would have
had to overrule the case. His exclusionary rule analysis, which permits suppression of evi-
dence from the trial court, but not the grand jury, would permit no other result.
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tive arguments can be formulated to support a different result,U
effort can be better expended in projecting the scope of its future
application. Clearly, the decision does not signal the end of the
exclusionary rule.3 5 What it may signal is a significant diminution
of fourth amendment rights, with no realistic means of redress.38 In
Calandra, the agents used a colorably valid search warrant. Tomor-
row, there may be no warrant at all. And the day after tomorrow,
police may engage in a warrantless search solely to gather evidence
for grand jury use, with no intention whatsoever of prosecuting the
victim. It is this potential for abuse that is most disturbing about
United States v. Calandra.
While the Court did not indicate that it would sanction deliber-
34. For example, the Court could have held that grand jury questions based on illegally
seized evidence constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Although Justice Powell
rejected this argument, he overlooked an analogy to Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
There, the Court held that a grand jury subpoena duces tecum, like a search warrant, could
be too broad and farsweeping to be sustained as reasonable. Similarly, in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court held that a subpoena which ordered the production of
incriminating papers constituted an unreasonable search and seizure where failure to comply
was deemed an admission of guilt. The Court relied heavily on the incriminating nature of
the papers, however, thus basing its decision to a large degree on the fifth amendment. See
Application of Certain Chinese Family Benevolent & Dist. Ass'ns, 19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal;
1956), (subpoena compelling production of records quashed as unreasonably broad). But see
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1972) (no showing of reasonableness required).
35. Justice Powell relied heavily on the continuing viability of the exclusionary rule at
trial. His argument against expanding the rule to grand jury proceedings was based on
incentive/deterrence: police have the greatest incentive to conduct an unlawful search when
a conviction will result. They presumably have little interest in illegally gathering evidence
for use by a grand jury, since the very evidence used to indict the victim of the search cannot
be used to convict him. To abandon the exclusionary rule at trial would remove this impedi-
ment and encourage illegal police activity. Ot course, Justice Powell's fundamental premise
is that most police activity is directed at the detection and apprehension of all criminals. This
is not always the case. See text following note 37 infra.
36. The traditional "remedy" for the victim of an illegal search and seizure is the exclu-
sibn of the evidence at his trial. The remedy assumes that the victim actually goes to trial; if
he does not, the remedy is meaningless. As the majority point out, Calandra may be able to
sue the offending officers and recover money damages. See Bivens .v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This leaves the impression that
the government may purchase the right to violate constitutional guarantees. 414 U.S. at 365
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent is fre-
quently noted, as is the absence of meaningful alternative remedies. See, e.g., Bivens, supra
at 411 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule-Can There
be an Effective Deterrent?, 47 L.A.B. BuLL. 91 (1972); McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An
Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 266 (1961); Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Oaks]; Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 255 (1961).
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ate, bad faith searches, neither did it indicate that it would not.
Instead, the Court gave tacit approval to an investigatory practice
which necessarily involves the violation of fourth amendment
rights. In the vast majority of cases, police search a person's house
to gather evidence to convict its occupant. This is the underlying
premise of the incentive/deterrence rationale for the exclusionary
rule. In some cases however, notably, those involving organized
crime, the prosecution may make a judgment that it is better to
sacrifice (through an illegal search and seizure) the conviction of a
small-time operator (0) in order to gather evidence against the key
men in the organization." After Calandra, the evidence may be used
not only against those whom it implicates, but the prosecution may
now legally call 0 before a grand jury and use the illegally seized
physical evidence to gather more testimonial evidence against oth-
ers."8 0 may plead his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, but only until he is granted immunity from the use
of his testimony against him. After Calandra, he may not move to
suppress the evidence before the grand jury. The witness's fear that
he may be killed if he testifies will result at the least in protective
custody, and at the most in an offer by the government to relocate
0 to a new community with .a new identity. For Justice Powell, it
is enough that 0 may not be prosecuted by the use of the illegally
seized evidence. But he may be forced to live in virtual exile from
his family and friends. It may be justifiable to ask a citizen to
voluntarily assume a new identity in order to fulfill his civic duty,
but it seems morally reprehensible that he can be forced to do so
through governmental exploitation of a deliberate violation of his
fourth amendment rights.
It therefore becomes worthwhile to seek workable limitations on
the Calandra holding. One limitation would be to require the good
faith execution of a search warrant. In discussing Silverthorne, Jus-
37. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court recognized that the rule was
ineffective where prosecution was not the goal of the search and seizure. See also Oaks, supra
note 36, at 708; White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 333, 351 (1970).
38. The result in Calandra was foreshadowed in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114
(1942), where the Court held admissible the testimony of two witnesses who turned state's
evidence only after being confronted with illegal wiretap evidence. No mention of the illegal
wiretaps was made at trial, and petitioners were not parties to the communications. Thus
the Court sanctioned pre-trial use of illegally obtained evidence as a means of gathering
further evidence against others. Justice Murphy dissented, saying that the result would
reduce fourth amendment protections.
1974
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tice Powell ignored that no search warrant had issued at any
time-a fact that could have served as a more persuasive basis for
distinction. This failure to comment may indicate that the absence
of a search warrant is not important to a majority of the Court and
leads to one of two conclusions: Either the Court is encouraging
warrantless searches in the absence of the traditional exceptions to
the warrant requirement,39 or it recognizes that if search warrants
are required, the police will simply fabricate them. Nevertheless,
the requirement of a warrant seems the most significant way to
restrict Calandra. A second limitation would be to grant standing
to suppress evidence to all those defendants whom the police reason-
ably expected to be implicated by the illegal search." This would
remove the incentive to violate O's rights and would encourage po-
lice compliance with fourth amendment guarantees, since evidence
gathered in a legal search could still be used. In light of the major-
ity's exclusionary rule analysis, however, adoption of this restriction
does not appear likely.
Of course, the result in United States v. Calandra does not compel
the police to knowingly violate the fourth amendment, nor does it
invite them to do so. But the overbroad conclusion arguably encour-
ages such activity. It may be that the Court felt that the only practi-
cal application of Calandra is in the investigation of organized
crime. The potential for abuse, however, transcends the facts in
Calandra and threatens the right of privacy of all citizens. It is to
be hoped, therefore, that the Court will take the earliest opportunity
to place workable limitations on the Calandra doctrine.
Robert S. Adams
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL COURTS -JUDICIALLY CREATED
REMEDIES-DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT-The
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii has held that
damages are recoverable in a federal action under the Constitution
39. The fourth amendment does not require a search warrant in all cases. It requires only
that searches be reasonable. Thus, the Court has authorized warrantless searches where the
object of the search is highly mobile, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automo-
bile); where the officers are conducting a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); or are in hot pursuit of a suspect, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
40. See White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
333 (1970).
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